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Abstract 
The research focused on understanding the effectiveness 
and applicability of CITES in curbing elephant poaching 
in Zimbabwe. CITES regulates international legal trade in 
ivory in an effort to curb poaching and this is addressed 
by the theory of complex interdependence. Signatory 
states adhere to the provisions of CITES but with all this 
in place elephant poaching is on the rise across Africa and 
Zimbabwe in particular. Zimbabwe relies on wildlife for 
tourism thus the threat to extinction is a threat to national 
revenue. Key informants were purposively sampled and 
documentary research was used for the case study. The 
main findings were that poaching Zimbabwe has become 
very rampant in the past few years with highest numbers 
recorded between 2012 and 2015. This has been attributed 
to the economics of demand and supply where high 
demand for ivory in Asian markets with countries such 
as China becoming the world’s largest destination market 
for illegal ivory. On the supply side, Zimbabwe is facing 
economic challenges thus locals are now engaging and 
aiding in poaching for economic survival. The research 
concluded that CITES weaknesses is in that it only 
provides state parties with technical support thus without 
the financial support anti-poaching efforts are ineffective. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Elephant poaching has become a global predicament 
which has resulted in considerable public pressure on 
consumer countries, particularly the United States, 
European Union, and Japan, to put harsher restrictions in 
place (Sands & Bedecarre, 2013). This development saw 
the United States and the United Kingdom in 1989 employ 
bans on ivory imports, while Japan and Hong Kong 
implemented amplified controls (Kaempfer & Lowenberg, 
2012). Elephants across Africa have become the target 
for poachers and armed non-state actors including rebel 
movements such as the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) to 
gratify increasing demand from growing middle classes 
across the world, predominantly in Southeast Asia where 
ivory products are considered status symbols and used as 
ingredients in traditional medicine (Beyers, 2011; Lawson 
& Vines, 2014). Transnational organized crime groups and 
armed non-state actors have exploited institutional flaws, 
legislative loopholes and civil conflicts in both source and 
consumer countries to feed the growing demand for rare 
possessions, acquiring enormous profits. A discordance 
between national legislation and institutional capacities for 
execution on the one hand, and multilateral environmental 
agreements such as the Convention on International Trade 
in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) 
on the other, means that national legislation often remains 
insufficient to support these initiatives, in protecting 
endangered species and regulating cross-border trade 
(TRAFFIC, 2007).
The African elephant (Loxodonta Africana) is listed in 
CITES Appendix I (endangered species threatened with 
extinction), except in Botswana, Namibia, Zimbabwe 
and South Africa, where it is listed in Appendix II, 
after a request from these states to relegate the status of 
their elephant populations due to their larger numbers 
(Milliken, 2013). Following calls by countries with 
healthy populations of elephants, CITES allowed one-off 
sales of ivory from elephants that had not been illegally 
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killed to Japan in 1999, and again in 2008. Beyers (2011) 
argues that despite the purpose of these sales to lessen 
a growing demand for ivory, it in fact increased, and 
from 2000 to 2002 at least 1,059 African elephants were 
discovered with their tusks removed. In some areas on the 
other hand where elephant populations were downgraded 
from Appendix I to II, such as those living south of the 
Zambezi River, they maintain living in large and well-
managed populations (Milliken, 2013). Whether or not 
the escalating demand for ivory was spiraled by the one-
off sales, the estimated poaching rate of African elephants 
in 2012 was 7.4 per cent; an untenably high level which 
presently exceeds natural population growth rates of 
around 5 percent. The general weight and number of 
large-scale ivory seizures measured at more than 500 kg 
surpass those recorded in any previous year.
Poaching is spreading mainly as a result of a rising 
demand for illegal ivory in the hastily rising economies 
of Asia, predominantly China and Thailand, which are 
the two key end-user markets globally (Milliken, Burn, 
Underwood & Sangalakula, 2012). The soaring levels 
of poaching are, in some cases, facilitated by convicts 
that, through lawlessness and subsequent abundance of 
small arms, offer optimal conditions for illegal killing of 
elephants. Further up the trade chain, extremely organized 
criminal networks function with relative impunity to 
move huge shipments of ivory off the continent and to 
markets in Asia. The occurrence of unregulated domestic 
ivory markets in several African cities, coupled with the 
huge number of potential Asian buyers living in Africa 
linked with infrastructure projects and resource extraction 
operations, also increase the demand for ivory. 
2 .  L I T E R A T U R E  R E V I E W  A N D 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This section reviews the theoretical framework that 
best describes the collectiveness of states in the drive to 
curb poaching and illegal trade of endangered species. 
The theory of complex interdependence is explored to 
elaborate how states depend on each other for problem 
solving solutions. Literature that is related CITES and 
its effectiveness in curbing elephant poaching globally, 
regionally and particularly in Zimbabwean will be 
critically analysed. This body of research gives an insight 
into what other scholars have discussed in the challenges 
of illegal trade of endangered species the world over. 
The CITES as the governing convention is analysed 
to determine whether its provisions are attainable for 
member states to implement effective strategies in curbing 
poaching of endangered species. 
2.1 Complex Interdependence Theory
The theory of complex interdependence as propounded 
by Keohane and Nye (1977) refers to ‘situations 
characterized by mutual effects among states or 
among actors in different countries’. Keohane and Nye 
(1987) further emphasize that the mutual effects of 
interdependence always entail both costs and benefits, 
since interdependence restricts autonomy and benefits 
from interdependence are not always guaranteed. 
Therefore, interdependence between states will directly 
or indirectly constrain state behavior in that states have 
to maximize the benefits and minimize the costs of 
interdependence. The world has become interdependent 
in economics, communications and human aspirations. 
The key actors of this period are ‘non-territorial’ actors, 
for instance multinational corporations, international 
organizations and worldwide social movements. Keohane 
and Nye (1987) discuss interdependence in the context of 
these assumptions. They start by defining interdependence 
as a position of mutual dependence where the loss of 
autonomy creates reciprocal costly effects. This in essence 
sees countries giving up their autonomy by becoming 
signatory to different international conventions including 
CITIES. States therefore depend on each other in 
upholding the provisions of CITIES in the preservation of 
endangered species. 
Complex interdependence is realized in the nature 
of international trade in wildlife and wildlife products 
as a major commercial activity. Hutchens (2014) posits 
that research undertaken to date have been stimulated 
because international trade has been seen as a problem for 
that specific species. CITES from its English language 
acronym, was adopted in the recognition that international 
action is essential to control and regulate international 
trade in threatened species of wild animals and plants to 
ensure their long-term survival. Mrema (2014) asserts 
that the Convention provides a framework to guarantee 
intergovernmental co-operation in this respect. Its 
adoption was based on the fact that international trade in 
wildlife is a concern wherein precautionary global action 
was both feasible and necessary. Further, a multilateral 
agreement would avoid a situation in which ad hoc 
unilateral trade restrictions penalised individual importing 
or exporting countries compared to other countries not 
applying such restrictions.
The trans-boundary character and threats created by 
cross-border illegal dealers has made several states realize 
that individual efforts and the conventional enforcement 
tactics are no longer proficient in providing effective 
protection to the African species from illegal trade 
organised by international structured crime syndicates 
(Mrema, 2014). Consequently, states feel there is a grave 
need for closer co-operation among designated national 
law enforcement agencies to save the invaluable African 
wild fauna and flora. That need has led to more rigorous 
and concerted efforts at regional levels to complement the 
already existing global mechanisms or instruments. The 
development and adoption of the Lusaka Agreement on 
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Co-operative Enforcement operations directed towards 
illegal trade in wildlife one of the attempts by African 
(the Eastern and Southern) states to adopt more stringent 
measures to decrease, and eradicate illegal trade in wild 
fauna and flora. It also implements and enforces CITES 
at a regional level. The Agreement aims at easing the 
administrative difficulties currently hampering cross-
border efforts to restrict trade.
2.2 Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES) 1975
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) is an 
international agreement to which States (countries) 
remain voluntarily. States that have decided to be bound 
by the Convention (‘joined’ CITES) are recognized as 
Parties. The reason of the Convention is to control the 
international trade in endangered species of fauna and 
flora to make certain their survival is not threatened. 
CITES entered into force in 1975 and presently 181 
States are signatories to the Convention (CITES, 2015). 
CITES works by subjecting the international trade in 
specimens of chosen species to certain controls, and all 
Parties to the Convention are obliged to put into practice 
a licensing method to authorize one or more Management 
Authorities to the management of that licensing structure 
and to assign one or more scientific authorities to advise 
them on the effects of trade on the status of the species. 
All Parties have to report yearly to the CITES Secretariat 
on the number of specimens traded, as well as on what 
national actions they have used to fulfil their international 
obligations (CITES, 2013; Lemieux and Clarke, 2009). 
The power of CITES rests in its capacity to impose 
preventive sanctions on the trade of protected species 
by states who are not complying with the Convention 
(Reeve, 2006). Effectively, these sanctions can hurt the 
capability of noncompliant countries to profit from the 
regulated wildlife market. The main objective of CITES 
is to prevent the overexploitation of species through 
international trade and to ensure their long term survival. 
The ultimate aim of the Convention is to promote species 
conservation.
i. The fundamental principles as laid out in Article II CITES 
(1975) state that, 
Appendix I shall include all species threatened with extinction 
which are or may be affected by trade. Trade in specimens of 
these species must be subject to particularly strict regulation in 
order not to endanger further their survival and must only be 
authorized in exceptional circumstances. 
ii. Appendix II shall include:
(a) all species which although not necessarily now threatened 
with extinction may become so unless trade in specimens of 
such species is subject to strict regulation in order to avoid 
utilization incompatible with their survival; and 
(b) other species which must be subject to regulation in order 
that trade in specimens of certain species referred to in sub-
paragraph (a) of this paragraph may be brought under effective 
control. 
iii. Appendix III shall include all species which any Party 
identifies as being subject to regulation within its jurisdiction 
for the purpose of preventing or restricting exploitation, and as 
needing the co-operation of other Parties in the control of trade. 
iv. the Parties shall not allow trade in specimens of species 
included in Appendices I, II and III except in accordance with 
the provisions of the present Convention.
In the case of Appendix II species, the Convention text 
identifies some aspects of ‘‘not detrimental’’ by requiring 
that export ‘‘should be limited in order to maintain that 
species throughout its range at a level consistent with its 
role in the ecosystems in which it occurs and well above 
the level at which that species might become eligible for 
inclusion in Appendix I’’. Therefore, all international trade 
in species listed in the two main CITES Appendices must 
be accompanied by an assessment of the impact of trade 
on wild populations, termed a Non-Detriment Finding 
(NDF). Signatories to CITES are required to designate 
one or more Scientific Authorities to make NDFs and to 
advise the Management Authorities who issue CITES 
permits. 
CITES strength lies in that it can protect many species 
and that the convention is one of the most widely signed 
international laws with 181 signatories. This means that 
it works across borders thus has the strength to regulate 
across borders. CITES is also legally binding on the 
Parties and so there must be political will to implement 
and locally enforceable laws where the poaching or trade 
may be happening. This can be equated to the shoot 
to kill policy that was practiced in Zimbabwe in 1993 
which had the fastest results and reduced poaching even 
though it was later criticized as violating human rights. 
However, the weakness in protecting endangered species 
is that it is difficult to enforce in that implementation 
varies from country to country. This is seen in that 
prosecution of offenders has often been stochastic and 
sentences are relatively light for the severity of the 
offence. Local legislation in both the countries of origin 
as well as destination countries is not strong enough to 
act as a deterrent. Wildlife authorities do not have the 
necessary authority, resources and political will from their 
governments to effectively carry out their jobs as Hwange 
National Park is said to have 50 rangers (Stiles, 2015) 
which is disproportionate to the numbers endangered 
species they are supposed to protect. 
Murphy (2012) posits that international conventions 
and treaties are among the most important formal sources 
of modern international law, also seen as conventional 
sources. Though officially the most commonly applicable 
and emanating foundation of international law, they are 
neither the only source nor the most authoritative one, for 
creating rights and obligations under international law. 
For any study of the sources of international law, Article 
38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice is 
always the preliminary point, which is acknowledged as a 
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definitive statement of the sources of international law. 
IFAW (2006) report states that smuggled ivory from 
Africa to China is processed in China’s regulated ivory 
traders exported to South Korea, Japan, Europe and 
United States of America. In January 2014 more than 
six tones of confiscated ivory were openly destroyed in 
Dongguan, Guangdong Province, a key hub of ivory trade 
in China (New York Times, 2014). This milestone move 
represented the first time that this country, the leading 
source of demand for illegal ivory from Central and East 
Africa (CNN, 2014), has destroyed what is considered an 
admired product by the growing Chinese middle class. 
Transnational organized crime operators and smaller-
scale armed groups are drawn to the high profits and 
low accountability linked with the wildlife crime trade. 
Variable, conflicting or weak legislation across states and 
regions coupled with pitiful rates of prosecution ensure 
sizable profits for the middlemen involved in the trade, 
who include expatriate Vietnamese and Chinese nationals 
living in Eastern and Southern Africa as well as Chinese 
and European nationals in the European Union (IFAW, 
2006).
2.3 brazzaville Draft Strategy (2015)
At continental level, the International Centre for Trade 
and Sustainable Development (2015) reported that African 
heads of state, experts, and policymakers converged 
for the International Conference on Illegal Trade in 
Wild Fauna and Flora in Africa from 27-30 April 2015 
in Brazzaville, Republic of Congo. The leaders made 
progress on advancing an Africa-wide draft strategy and 
action plan to decrease and eradicate the illegal trade in 
wild animal and plant species. The draft strategy would 
target trafficking of the continent’s fauna such as rhinos 
and elephants, as well as clamp down on illegal fishing 
and timber trade. According to African Union (2015) 
the Brazzaville Draft Strategy 2015 would be functional 
from 2015-2024. The document represents the first such 
pan-African move towards tackling the illegal wildlife 
trade challenge. The strategy and its action plan continue 
to be developed in consultation with African nations. 
The Draft Strategy outlines seven key objectives for 
African states tackling illegal wildlife crime and trade 
which include; increase the capacity of source and transit 
states in detecting illegal activities, particularly at borders, 
increasing capacity, increasing political commitment; 
enhanced engagement with consumer states to reduce 
demand for illegal products, knowledge and public 
awareness; improvement of governance and regional 
cooperation; the promotion of economic development and 
local community livelihoods through sustainable use of 
wild fauna and flora and reduce and possibly eliminate 
the economic and security impact of environmental 
crime; (International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development, 2015). The draft strategy looks to enhance 
the legal and institutional frameworks dealing with illegal 
wildlife in African nations but also aid implementation of 
international commitments.
African Union (2015) says that the Brazzaville Draft 
Strategy also aims to help raise adequate resources to 
help with its implementation. Furthermore, importance 
is placed on the fundamental role of local communities, 
whose participation in managing the affected natural 
resources is deemed crucial by a number of experts. The 
draft strategy also focuses on transit states and final 
destinations of illegally traded specimens as having a 
part to play in clamping down the trade. Participants at 
the Brazzaville meeting recommended holding a joint 
conference with consumer and transit countries in Asia in 
order to agree on a joint action plan to eradicate the illicit 
utilization of wildlife products from Africa.
 The Brazzaville Draft Strategy also looks at issues 
of political instability, military and civil conflicts 
and economic insecurity being providers of major 
impediments to the effective enforcement of African 
wildlife laws. Guerilla war in Mozambique in the 1980s, 
in Angola, civil war in Somalia, and civil conflicts in DR 
Congo have depleted natural resources and facilitated 
cross-border incursions by poachers into game reserves 
and parks (Gurung and Guragain, 2000). Weapons from 
Mozambique to Swaziland and from Somalia to Kenya 
have been used by poachers to seriously decrease those 
countries’ endangered species. Poaching has also provided 
a supply of revenue for guerilla movements in strife to an 
African continent.
2.4 The SADC Protocol on Wildlife Conservation 
and Law Enforcement (1999)
In order to efficiently protect wildlife, SADC developed 
the Protocol on Wildlife Conservation and Law 
Enforcement of 1999.The objectives of the Protocol on 
Wildlife Conservation and Law Enforcement emphasise 
the need for regionally approved approaches to 
protection, management, and the enforcement of illegal 
uses of wildlife. Information exchanges concerning 
wildlife management and utilisation is vital for effective 
conservation. Mrema (2014) posits that the Protocol on 
Wildlife Conservation and Law Enforcement promotes 
national and regional capacity building and the facilitation 
of community based wildlife management.
The SADC Protocol came as a concerted effort by 
the regional body in trying to curb wildlife poaching. 
This was after its predecessor, the Lusaka Agreement 
was conceptualized during the first African Wildlife Law 
Enforcement Cooperation Conference held under the 
auspices of CITES and the Zambian Ministry of Tourism 
in Lusaka from 9-11 December 1992, by senior wildlife 
law enforcement officers as a mechanism to deal with the 
problems faced by national law enforcement agencies in 
attempting to combat international wildlife smuggling 
syndicates and in particular lack of formal means to enable 
cross-border cooperation (Mrema, 2014). Other problems 
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identified include: cross-border poaching, difficulties 
associated with investigations, and customs and the size 
and fluidity of the borders among many African countries, 
such as Tanzania’s Selous Game Reserve, which makes 
cross-border smuggling between Lindi, Iringa, and Coast 
region a lucrative business for poachers (Stiles, 2015). 
Ill-equipped wildlife technicians, limited helicopters to 
conduct surveillance and field patrols, lack of trained law 
enforcement officers to conduct undercover intelligence 
operations coupled with lack of administrative capacity, 
made it difficult for countries to adequately respond to 
sophisticated and well resourced cross-border smugglers. 
Child (2012) notes the SADC Protocol also came 
into force as the region noted that poor or inadequate 
laws were considered as impeding factors to the national 
efforts to combat illegal trade or smuggling of wildlife 
species. For instance, the powers of enforcement officers 
are limited and constrained to their national jurisdictions 
and the officers are powerless across borders while in 
hot pursuit or to institute legal proceedings against well-
known poachers, unless legal mechanisms, such as 
extradition agreements, exist. Even where extradition 
arrangements exist, rules of evidence which differ from 
country to country make it difficult for the prosecution 
cases to succeed as they could be knocked down on 
technical grounds (Cumming, Du Toit and Stuart, 1993). 
Additionally, the extradition procedures do not essentially 
allow for swift action to be taken. Besides low penalties 
and unevenness in the severity of the penalties imposed 
by most African countries against illegal smugglers of 
wildlife species compared to the value of the specimen 
poached or smuggled has always been a discouraging 
factor in undertaking legal processes against the offenders 
and, hence, fail to deter people from engaging in such 
lucrative business. 
2.5 The Skukuza Agreement (2000)
The ratification and implementation of CITES as a 
source of international law is seen by the willingness of 
parties to domesticate provisions of the agreements at 
continental, regional and national level. In November 
2000 the governments of Zimbabwe, South Africa and 
Mozambique signed the Skukuza Agreement formally 
establishing the Gaza-Kruger-Gonarezhou Transfrontier 
Conserva t ion  Area  (GKG) (S t i l es ,  2015) .  The 
conservation area covers 99,800 square kilometers (km2) 
(66,000 km2 in Mozambique; 22,000 km2 in South Africa; 
and 12,000 km2 in Zimbabwe) Mrema (2014). The ‘core 
protected areas’ are Kruger National Park in South Africa, 
Gonarezhou National Park in Zimbabwe, and Zinave and 
Banhine National Parks and Coutada Wildlife Utilisation 
Area in Mozambique. The three governments went on 
to sign the International Treaty formally establishing the 
Great Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Park (GLTP) 
in December 2002 (Wolmer, 2003). 
This treaty made provision for the establishment of 
the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Area 
(GLTFCA). GLTP comprises of the Kruger National 
Park and the Makuleke region in South Africa, Limpopo 
National Park in Mozambique and Gonarezhou National 
Park in Zimbabwe. The governance structure comprises 
the Ministerial Committee comprising the Ministers of 
the three participating states which is the decision making 
body. Mrema (2014) points out that the Joint Management 
Board, represented by members of the three countries 
report to and serves as Advisory body to the Ministers and 
is responsible for the overall management and execution 
of programs and projects aimed at furthering the intention 
of the treaty. It also has decision making powers on 
operational matters. Four technical committees to focus 
on specific key development areas of the GLTFCA were 
also established which are Conservation and Veterinary, 
Tourism, Finance and Human Resources, Safety & 
Security (Mrema, 2014)
2.6 Zimbabwe Parks and Wildlife Act (PWA) (1975)
The Parks and Wildlife Act was enacted in 1975 and is 
named the Parks and Wildlife Act (PWA), implementing 
its obligations under CITES and providing for a relatively 
comprehensive series of offences and penalties governing 
illegal trade in wildlife. Further amendments to the 
enhanced penalty regime under the PWA [Chapter 20:14] 
in 2011 greatly increased the severity and effectiveness of 
these penalties (Lemieux and Clarke 2009). In particular, 
severe mandatory minimum custodial sentences apply to 
offences involving rhinoceros or other specially protected 
animals such as pangolins, and to illegal trade in ivory, 
which fall well within the United Nations Office of Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC) definition of “serious offences” 
(Stiles, 2015). Courts may also impose custodial sentences 
ranging from one to three years for less serious wildlife 
offences. The PWA also provides for the possibility of 
fines for all wildlife offences and for severe mandatory 
compensatory payments for offences resulting in the death 
of an animal. The Parks and Wildlife Act (1975) General 
Laws Amendment No.5 (GN148/2011) which was an 
amendment to section 128 addresses the issue of poaching 
and illegal hunting and inserts punitive clauses. It states 
that;
The unlawful possession of or trading in ivory or any trophy of 
rhinoceros or any other specially protected animal that may be 
specified by the Minister; shall be liable to (i) on first conviction 
to imprisonment for a period not less than nine years (ii) on a 
second or subsequent conviction, to imprisonment for a period 
not less than eleven years.
Some of the provisions of the Act clearly lay out what 
is illegal in (PWA, 1975) [Chapter 20:14] section 97 as; 
(1) The possession of any animal or fish or the meat or trophy 
of a freshly killed animal shall be prima facie evidence against a 
person accused of contravening any provision of this Act that he 
has hunted such animal or caught such fish. 
The above provisions show how Zimbabwe has 
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robust legislation in place that is theoretically capable of 
combating wildlife crime and a relatively comprehensive 
legal framework aimed at protecting and conserving 
wildlife and natural resources, establishing conservation 
areas and prohibiting illegal wildlife trade. However, 
the issue of prima facie evidence against an offender is a 
loophole within this law. The Herald 24 February (2016) 
cited that four suspected poachers had been cleared by 
the court of any wrongdoing after the state failed to prove 
prima facie evidence against his clients. This means that 
poaching activities are taking place but as long as the state 
has no ‘animal or fish or the meat or trophy of a freshly 
killed animal’ (PWA, 1975) then it cannot prove any 
wrongdoing which renders the law ineffective in curbing 
elephant poaching. 
PWA (1975) [Chapter 20, p.14] section 46 (b) states 
that; 
(2) The possession by any person of any ivory or rhinoceros 
horn shall, unless the contrary is proved, be evidence against 
such person that such ivory or rhinoceros horn was not 
registered under any regulations made in terms of paragraph 
(t) of subsection (2) of section one hundred and twenty-nine. 
(3) If any person who has authority to hunt or fish in terms 
of this Act is found in possession of animals or fish in excess 
of the numbers so authorized or of any species or sex not so 
authorized, he shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, 
to have hunted such animals or caught such fish in contravention 
of this Act.
The weakness of this law however, as stated by 
(Mrema, 2014) is that, rhinos are allowed to be hunted 
for trophies and for live export thus fostering illegal rhino 
poaching. This even extends to the issue of Cecil the Lion 
where Minister of Environment, Water and Climate Hon. 
Oppah Muchinguri was quoted by Thornycroft (2015, 
p.15) in The Telegraph newspaper as saying that; “We 
approached the police and then the Prosecutor General, 
and it turned out that Palmer came to Zimbabwe because 
all the papers were in order,” meaning that Walter Palmer 
was well within his rights to hunt and is therefore immune 
to section two and three of the PWA.
Success of the PWA is however seen in the exceptional 
Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous 
Resources (CAMPFIRE) project. The CAMPFIRE project 
has been represented as an antidote to the colonial ‘fortress 
conservation’ discourse which diluted people’s power 
over their environment and criminalised their use of game 
(Alexander and McGregor, 2000). Instead, communities 
are cast as ‘partners in conservation’. The central tenets 
of this scheme, which has become something of an icon 
among conservation agencies and international NGOs, 
are that neighbouring communities must receive direct 
benefits from protected areas and have some say in 
wildlife management and use if conservation policies are 
to be effective (Child, 1995). This implies ‘sustainable 
utilisation’, rather than preservation, of wildlife with a 
portion of hunting or tourism revenues disbursed to local 
authorities. The CAMPFIRE model has achieved the 
status of conventional intelligence in the Southern African 
region and internationally, and is approved by a range of 
generous donors. It has spawned a research industry and 
has been the subject of countless workshops, conferences 
and publications (Wolmer, 2003). 
2.8 Endangered Species
Endangered species according to (CITES, 1975) are any 
animal in danger of extinction. The African elephant is 
part of the endangered species as it is listed in Appendix 
2 of the convention. According to World Wildlife Fund 
(2016) close to 35,000 species are sheltered under the 
CITES. They are listed in three appendices according 
to their rank of protection. International, commercial 
trade in species listed in appendix I is approved only in 
extraordinary circumstances. The international trade in 
species listed in appendix II is permissible but is regulated 
and restricted to guarantee that it is sustainable and legal 
and it does not threaten the species survival in the wild. 
Appendix III includes species that are protected in at least 
one member state, which has asked the other parties for 
support in controlling the trade of this species (CITES, 
2013).
Mrema (2014) points out that at the global level, 
CITES has put in place a legal framework to control 
international trade in endangered species of wild animals 
and plants listed in the appendices. In spite of the fact that 
CITES does not deliberately state its objective, it is clear 
that the Convention intends to ensure, that international 
trade in specimens of endangered wild fauna and flora 
is regulated and does not threaten conservation status of 
declining species. The Convention does this by controlling 
and regulating international trade in three ways. First 
(Mrema. 2014, p.228) states that;
It prohibits, with only few exceptions, international commercial 
trade in species listed in Appendix I; that is, those threatened 
with extinction. (Articles II (1) and III) The species listed, as at 
March 2004, in Appendix I include well over 800 endangered 
species (827 species, 52 subspecies and 19 populations). 
Second, it gives the responsibility to the exporting State to 
regulate, through the issuance of permit, trade in specimen of 
species listed in Appendix II that is not already threatened with 
extinction to warrant inclusion in Appendix I but which may 
become so if not controlled. (Articles II (2) and III). Over 30,000 
species (32,540 species, 49 sub species and 25 populations) are 
listed in Appendix II. Third, CITES gives an option to the Parties 
to gain other nations’ cooperation, by enforcing their domestic 
legislation, which regulate export of species not listed in either 
Appendix I or II by listing them under Appendix III. (Articles II 
(3) and V) Over 200 species (291 species, 12 sub species and 2 
populations) are listed under Appendix III.
One of the protected species under CITES is the 
African elephant. Elephants are found in 37 countries 
or ‘range states’ in sub-Saharan Africa. According to 
Challender & MacMillan (2013), elephants are a source 
of bush meat, but their white gold provides a considerable 
reward for poachers and it is widely received that ivory 
driven poaching in the 1970s and 1980s led to a significant 
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decline in elephant populations. Van Aarde & Jackson 
(2006) posit that more than 1.3 million elephants roamed 
Africa in 1979; in 1989, there were roughly 600,000. In 
Kenya, uncarved ivory was worth $2.50 a pound in 1969, 
$34 a pound in 1978, and more than $90 a pound in 1989 
(Messer, 2000). Because larger tusks meant better profits, 
bull elephants with tusks weighing six or seven times 
those of females were the common targets of poaching. 
This led to tilted sex ratios in some herds, calling into 
question their long-term survival. It also meant more 
elephants were killed to meet the weight demands of 
the international ivory market as the number of bulls 
dwindled. The raw ivory gotten by poachers is sold to 
wholesalers and craftsmen and is often shipped overseas 
before being carved into an assortment of items such as 
chopsticks, figurines, piano keys and chess sets. Tourists 
visiting Africa are also responsible for the continuous 
demand for ivory (Milliken, Emslie & Talukdar, 2009).
The illegal trade in flora and fauna presents a risk to 
many uncommon species and thus to biodiversity and, 
for that reason, has increasingly attracted the interest 
of conservation agencies (Rice, 2008). Milliken (2012) 
reports that during the past 40 years, conservation 
agencies have exerted demands on national governments 
and international agencies to stiffen laws and augment 
legal penalties for wildlife crimes. Numerous countries 
employ forestry and fisheries officers to enforce the 
laws and have formed specialised law enforcement and 
customs units to arrest traffickers and impound the plants 
and animals in their possession. These efforts on occasion 
lead to violence. For example, national park rangers in 
some African countries have engaged in armed conflict 
with poachers, with many killed on either side, in order to 
protect the animals and safeguard tourism. 
Milliken (2002) states that apart from Zimbabwe and 
Japan, CITES has not directly intervened to evaluate 
conformity with the recommendations for internal trade 
in ivory as contained in Resolution Conf. Most ivory 
markets stay unregulated and in the end domestic trade in 
ivory gives rise to trade which is decidedly international 
in scale. Reports from the Elephant Trade Information 
System (ETIS), one of the two systems operating under 
the auspices of CITES to follow illegal trade in elephant 
products bring a strong condemnation of the role 
played by domestic markets in undermining elephant 
conservation in Africa. 
Greed also draws poachers to a trade that is allegedly 
low risk and high profit. Haken (2011) notes that the 
worldwide unlawful trade in wildlife products inflicts 
considerable harmony in developing countries where 
economic and structural damage imposed on already weak 
developing states is even more destructive than losses in 
biodiversity. Traffickers take advantage of deficiency and 
disparity to attract poachers, operating in territories with 
little government presence. They have a huge interest in 
preventing source countries from developing economically 
and structurally. Rosen & Smith (2010) also note that 
illegal wildlife trade undermines the efforts of developing 
states to administer their natural resources. This results in 
the loss of potential profits that could be available through 
development and tourism; here it is important to identify 
the connection between rebellion groups and remote, 
almost stateless wildlife reserves which give ideal cover 
and sustenance for rebels fleeing state authority. This ‘loss 
of earnings’ would be on top of the traditionalist estimate 
that the illegal trade in wildlife excluding timber and 
fisheries are worth $10 billion per year. 
Ivory poaching activity is centered particularly on 
national parks in the Great Lakes region such as Garamba 
National Park in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
(Agger & Hutson, 2013; Titeca, 2013). Titeca analyses 
the level of the ivory trade in and around Eastern Africa, 
noting the transit hotspot of Mombasa, with ivory flows 
getting through the DRC and Uganda to the coast in 
Kenya ready for shipment to Asia. Traditional poachers, 
Congolese soldiers, South Sudanese armed groups and 
to a lesser extent members of the Lord’s Resistance Amy 
are all implicated in the ivory trade. Titeca (2013) points 
out that ivory tusks harvested by the LRA are usually 
exchanged for food and arms and that they are less 
involved in transnational organized crime flows.
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGy 
The study employed qualitative methodology. Data 
was collected through key informant interviews and 
documentary search. The research participants for the 
study were drawn from Ministry of Environment; Water 
and Climate (MoEWC), National Parks and Wildlife 
Management Authority (NPWMA), Environmental 
Management Agency (EMA), Zimbabwe Republic Police 
(ZRP), Zimbabwe Conservation Task Force (ZCTF), and 
World Wildlife Fund (WWF)
4. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
This section provides the key findings for the study.
Legislative framework and wildlife conservation 
in Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe first adopted a specific Policy and Plan for 
Elephant Management in 1997 with the long term vision 
to:
Conserve elephants at levels that will enable them to contribute 
to the conservation of biodiversity, national development and 
Zimbabwe’s cultural heritage.
As a matter of policy the plan required that at least 
four demographically and genetically viable populations 
of elephants be maintained, that elephant densities be 
kept below the levels at which they might compromise 
biodiversity, and that elephant range remain at or above 
the 1996 level. At the time illegal killing of elephants 
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was at a very low level and the plan placed little emphasis 
on law enforcement. That situation has since changed 
drastically, with poaching at a crisis state in some countries, 
although it is said to not be the same extent in Zimbabwe. 
The Parks and Wildlife Act (1975) has its strengths 
in the curbing of elephant poaching. Ellis (2010) closely 
followed a case where Tichaona Mutyairi, a Zimbabwean 
rhino poacher with the infamous Mazhongwe gang, was 
sentenced to 17 years in jail after being captured during an 
exchange of gunfire with the police in October 2009. The 
Masvingo regional court took a strict stance, punishing 
the poacher to the full extent of Zimbabwe’s wildlife 
and firearm laws although this sentence remains a rare 
occurrence among captured poachers. However, Ellis 
(2010) goes on to state that international conservationists 
closely watched the Mutyairi case given the highly varied 
outcomes in several court cases against members of rhino 
poaching gangs that had recently been finalized or were 
still underway. This is because previous court cases have 
seen many poachers being released from jail escaping 
punishment instead of facing strong, consistent sentences 
that would deter them from hunting down Zimbabwe’s 
elephants and remaining rhinos.
The Parks and Wildlife Act is the pivotal legislative 
framework which protects wildlife in Zimbabwe in 
conforming to the CITES provisions. The Director 
Wildl i fe  f rom the  Nat ional  Parks  and Wildl i fe 
Management Authority said that:
Zimbabwe has a well developed set of policies and laws 
providing for protected areas and wildlife conservation. The 
policy and legislation explicitly view wildlife as an economic 
resource which can be used sustainably for the benefit of the 
nation, private farmers and local communities. The legislation 
provides for and regulates use of wildlife outside of protected 
areas including private and communal land. It makes provision 
for different categories of wildlife so that certain species can be 
afforded a higher level of protection. It also provides for land 
holders to gain some use rights over wildlife, within an overall 
system that is based on the Parks and Wildlife Management 
Authority issuing permits for most forms of use. PWA provides 
a higher level of protection to rhino and elephant as it regulates 
and controls the trade in ivory and rhino horn and follow 
CITES principles. It enables the shooting of wildlife (including 
specially protected species such as elephant) in self defence or in 
defence of someone else’s life. Trophy hunting is allowed and is 
regulated and professional hunters have to be licensed according 
to legislation. 
Elephant Poaching 
Poachers have been using poisoning as a method of 
killing. A total of 317 elephants were killed by poisoning 
between 2012 and 2015 with the numbers ranging from 
111, 109, 21 and 76 respectively. Elephant poaching has 
taken different methods over the years in Zimbabwe. The 
two major methods used are shooting and poisoning and 
a few incidences of snaring. Subsidiary laws are in place 
to guard against poaching of any kind thus the National 
Parks and Wildlife Management Authority works hand in 
hand with stakeholders from the ZRP, EMA and others 
to make sure they work against poaching. Poisoning has 
caused a huge stair among conservationists as it kills large 
numbers of animals at one goal. However, EMA protects 
against poisoning of flora and fauna and has the requisite 
remedies for violations of the law. 
Most of the poisoning has been done with the use 
of cyanide which is regarded as a toxic substance as 
alluded to in the Environmental Management Act (EMA). 
However, the legislative framework is in place in the fight 
against poaching of elephants and specifically poisoning 
as a method of poaching. The Herald Newspaper (2016) 
quoted ZRP Spokesperson saying they had recovered large 
amounts of cyanide since January 2015, including more 
than a tonne of the poison at a warehouse in Bulawayo in 
the first quarter of 2015.
On January 7(2015), the supervisor at BAC Logistics Belmont 
Bulawayo was found in possession of 116x50kg of sodium 
cyanide, 9x40kg sulphuric acid and 44x30kg nitric acid. The 
accused person was asked to produce a licence or permit 
and failed, leading to his arrest. The value of the recovered 
substances was US$22 991. In another incident in Dete, police 
recovered 100g of cyanide and arrested three suspects for 
possession of the substance. On New Year’s Eve (31 December 
2015), police recovered 50kg of cyanide from another suspect 
at a roadblock at the 10km peg along the Gweru-Shurugwi-
Zvishavane Road.
Shooting has been used as the traditional method of 
operation for poaching. Statistics show that the highest 
number of shootings took place in 2015 where poachers 
shot 221 elephants with 184 elephants shot in 2013. 
The inspector from the ZRP Minerals and Border 
Control said that, 
Poachers are now using sophisticated ammunition such as 
silencers as they have improved the art of poaching. 
He highlighted that the ZRP in 2016 has so far 
confiscated at least 10 AK47s, .303 and .375 hunting 
rifles and nearly 200 rounds of ammunition have been 
recovered from Zambian poachers, mainly in the North 
West Matabeleland region. There are however two laws 
that guard against poaching by shooting namely the 
Firearms Act 1972 (Chapter 10:09) and the Criminal Law 
(Codification and Reform) Act 2004 (Chapter 9:23). The 
ZRP key informant specified that one will be charged 
under the Firearms Act if found in possession of a semi-
automatic rifle such as a .303 and the Criminal Law 
(Codification and Reform) Act applies if suspect is found 
in possession of a rifle such as an AK47. These laws have 
been effective in curbing elephant poaching as suspected 
poachers have been charged and convicted for unlawful 
possession of such firearms. The laws have the following 
provisions:
Effectiveness of Anti-Poaching Laws
Wildlife conservation and particularly anti-poaching 
in Zimbabwe is covered by a number of laws. Key 
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informants from the WWF, ZRP, ZCTF echoed the 
sentiments that Zimbabwe is said to have some of the 
most effective anti-poaching laws which are deterrent 
enough to prevent poaching in the country. This assertion 
was also verified in the statistics obtained on the arrests 
and convictions of poachers from 2012 to date. The 
Custom and Excise Act of 1963 is another law which is 
meant to deter people from illegal trade of ivory. The Act 
curbs against the smuggling of ivory or ivory products. 
The article quoted the Zimbabwe Parks and Wildlife 
Authority spokesperson; 
(We) confirm that an Asian national was today arrested at the 
Harare International Airport for illegal possession of ivory. He 
is 34 years old and is a truck driver in his country of origin. He 
was found with 17 raw pieces of ivory and several worked ivory 
which included bangles, chop sticks and beads weighing 113.9 
kilogrammes valued at approximately $28,250. The suspect was 
arrested as he waited to board an Ethiopian Airline destined for 
Malaysia.
Origins of Poachers 
Poaching has become a global billion dollar industry 
which has prompted the rise of global syndicates for 
easy access and movement of illegally acquired ivory. 
According to the statistics of elephant poaching in 
Zimbabwe, indigenous people are the biggest culprits but 
they are not working on their own as ivory trade is not a 
lucrative business in Zimbabwe (Hutchens, 2014). The 
statistics will show that the main poaching nationalities 
involved in Zimbabwe are Zambians who constitute 
a huge percentage of arrested poachers and lately the 
Chinese have joined the bandwagon of poachers. 
The challenge of Zambian poachers is not selective to 
Zimbabwe only but the region as a whole. Six elephants 
were killed in Botswana and it was linked to Zambian 
poachers (Hutchens, 2014). The report goes on to say that 
two Zambian nationals in a group of at least 30 suspected 
elephant poachers were shot and killed by the Botswana 
Defence Force during a gun battle at the Chobe National 
Park on January 4, 2014. At least four Zambian nationals 
are on trial in Botswana after being arrested in connection 
with illegal possession of ivory since February 2014.’ 
The Standard newspaper (27 April 2016) reported that 
the Zambian government says Chinese ivory trafficking 
syndicates based in the Southern African countries are 
sponsoring the influx of Zambian poachers blamed for the 
recent spike in elephant deaths in the region. Organised 
Zambian poaching syndicates have since 2012 mounted 
numerous cross-border poaching expeditions into 
neighbouring countries with increasingly fatal results. The 
(Standard 27 April 2016:5) states that:
In the first months of 2016, at least 66 elephant tusks were 
recovered from Zambian poachers during 14 separate anti-
poaching operations in Zimbabwe’s national parks in the 
Zambezi Valley. By the end of February, six suspected Zambian 
poachers had been killed in gun battles with Zimbabwean 
rangers in the area.
Community participation in elephant poaching
The research discovered that community participation 
is lacking in wildlife conservation. This was deduced 
from key informants from the Wildlife Conservation 
Task Force, Zimbabwe Republic Police, Chief ’s 
Representatives in Chitsa and Tshovani communities and 
the statistics attained on the poaching trends. Communities 
do not feel they are benefiting from living in wildlife 
reserves or from preserving the wildlife itself thus they 
are then involved in poaching activities. A key informant 
from the Chitsa community said that: 
Our understanding is that elephants bring in money for the 
government and we are supposed to get some money for our 
livelihoods through programmes like CAMPFIRE but we 
have not and we are struggling to send our children to school 
thus prompting the community to engage in illegal poaching 
activities. 
Zimbabwe Conservation Task Force Chairman went 
further to explain that communities are not ignorant but 
feel prejudiced thus the involvement in illegal activities. 
He said, 
Communities understand their role in wildlife conservation but 
also understand the role of government and its shortcomings. 
Community projects are supposed to be implemented through 
the CAMPFIRE but in reality, many of the projects are 
implemented away from the areas from which the revenues 
come from and where the people have to bear the cost of 
wildlife damage. Although these communities benefit to some 
extent from the distribution of meat from animals culled in the 
adjacent national parks or killed while crop raiding in their area, 
this is insufficient incentive to encourage a measure of tolerance 
towards wildlife. Moreover, the people take no part in making 
decisions about the use and management of these wildlife 
resources. As a result, CAMPFIRE is not a sustained success. 
CONCLUSIONS
The study concludes that CITES is applicable in the 
protection of elephants as an endangered species in 
Zimbabwe. Many species including the elephant are 
on the brink of extinction due to over harvesting of the 
species for commercial purposes such as sport hunting 
(Hutchens, 2014). CITES therefore regulates international 
trade to ensure that there is no over harvesting in 
producer countries. It sets quotas for harvesting, for 
example Zimbabwe is allowed to export a maximum 
of 500 elephants per year (GoZ, 2014). CITES banned 
international trade in ivory thus restricting it to local legal 
trade in end products. A tourist can only export value 
added ivory, that is carved ivory such as bangles and so on 
and they are only allowed to export a maximum of three 
carved pieces per individual. 
Wildlife management challenges are mainly financial. 
Wildlife management requires a lot of resources. Currently 
wildlife management in Zimbabwe is not supported by 
financial resources from central government. Wildlife 
pays for its own conservation (Frost & Bond, 2008). 
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The resources raised are not enough and fall far short of 
required amounts. This affects staff recruitment especially 
for rangers who should do anti-poaching operations. 
They are too few covering large tracts of land. This 
means poachers enter using unmanned areas. Rangers 
also need equipment in the field such as uniforms, food, 
ammunition, tents, secure communication and so on which 
allow them to be more effective. Without these their 
effort are seriously compromised. Parks needs all terrain 
vehicles for deployment and movement of equipment 
and goods. Mobility is therefore a challenge without the 
right vehicles. The research findings also concluded that 
CITES has its weaknesses in helping states with wildlife 
management. The body only provides state parties with 
technical support thus the financial aspect of the support is 
lacking for which therefore hinders anti-poaching efforts 
(Groom, Gandiwa, Gandiwa, and Van der Westhuizen, 
2013). 
Zimbabwe is ranked as one of the elephant range state 
with remarkable anti-poaching legislation which was 
also concluded by the research. Wildlife management 
and elephant poaching in particular is guided mainly by 
the Parks and Wildlife Act of 1975 (GoZ, 1975). The 
Act allows for the formation of an agency, the Parks and 
Wildlife Management Authority in tandem with CITES 
provisions. The PWA makes provision for the Minister 
to declare certain animals as specially protected under 
Section 44. In terms of the Act, no-one may hunt, have in 
their possession, or sell a live specially protected animal 
or the meat or trophy from such an animal without a 
permit (GoZ, 1975). The trophy of any specially protected 
animal must be surrendered to the state if not obtained 
by a permit. The Act specifies the purposes for which the 
Minister may issue a permit for use of specially protected 
animals (Section 46), but provides the Minister with some 
flexibility as he or she may issue a permit for any purpose 
which in the opinion of the Minister is in the interests of 
the conservation of animals. 
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